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The social construction of character 
ABSTRACT 
There has been increased interest in character strengths or virtues in recent years in social 
research and in various policy domains. However, while the notion of virtue has gained 
credibility in the fields of positive psychology and moral philosophy, it has yet to be 
satisfactorily considered from the perspective of social theory – in spite of the ongoing calls 
of researchers who have identified the need for further investigation into the role of culture 
and social context in the development of individuals’ characters. In order to consider how 
good character and excellence in specific virtues are formed and sustained in social context, 
this article gives a theoretical account of character and virtue using well-known 
microsociological concepts. It is argued that whereas virtues are often understood as 
psychological ‘traits’ or ‘dispositions’, they are also socially practiced and represented. 
Analyses of their related social processes are therefore appropriate and empirically 
promising, particularly in institutional settings, and can complement other theoretical and 
methodological approaches. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There has been increasing interest among researchers, policy makers and practitioners in 
what could be dubbed the ‘science of character’ in the last two decades – how individuals 
may develop positive character strengths or virtues, such as honesty, compassion, self-control 
or courage, and what impact such attributes may have on a range of outcomes, including 
happiness, academic success, and human flourishing. Two main strands in this movement 
have been the rise in popularity of positive psychology (Seligman et al, 2009) and a 
renaissance of the Aristotelean notion of virtue (Kristjànsson, 2015). In spite of the current 
interest in character internationally, in fields as diverse as education, business, health and the 
military, there remains debate over the definition of key concepts, and scientific 
understanding is still extremely limited, particularly from a social, cultural, or intercultural 
perspective. Scholars have recently emphasised and stressed the limits of research in these 
respects. There is inadequate understanding of the role of social and economic context in 
psychological studies of virtue development (Clement & Bollinger, 2016). Methods of 
investigation and evaluation of character education interventions do not adequately account 
for cultural differences and values (Alexander, 2016; Camfield, 2016). Studies of virtue in 
institutional contexts have been unsatisfactory in demonstrating how quantitative measures of 
character strengths may accurately capture individuals’ development in specific virtues across 
time and in relation to targeted interventions (Duckworth & Yeager, 2015). Given these 
identified weaknesses, it is timely to consider character and virtue in sociological perspective 
(Maccarini, 2016). 
As psychologists and virtue ethicists prioritize the importance of character attributes 
to explain moral behavior or positive outcomes, critics, known as ‘situationists’, have 
stressed the importance of context in moral action and argue against the view that the 
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dispositions of individuals should be treated as the main determinants and explanatory factors 
of moral outcomes and behaviours (Harman, 1999; Doris, 2002; Appiah, 2008). The purpose 
of this article is to show how virtues are defensible as explanatory concepts, and moreover, to 
explain them by recourse to the social processes by which they may be practiced, understood, 
attributed, transmitted, developed and sustained. This builds upon a call in scientific literature 
to develop a robust and empirically-grounded theory of the complex multi-directional 
relationships between character attributes, context and behavior (Chen, 2013; Jost & Jost, 
2009; Samuels & Casebeer, 2005). While other approaches are likely possible, one way to do 
this is to consider the synergies between social theory and classical virtue ethics on the one 
hand, and how sociological approaches may complement the psychological study of character 
as part of a constructive dialogue between disciplines, on the other (Denzin, 2010). 
Previously, sociological approaches have been largely overlooked, presumably because they 
are thought to be prone to relativism and/or situationism and therefore antithetical to the very 
notion of stable, objective traits and dispositions possessed by individuals as favoured by 
many psychologists and virtue ethicists alike (e.g. Bleidorn, 2015). While researchers have 
begun to suggest ecological models of character development (e.g. Lerner & Callina, 2014; 
Overton, 2015; Nucci, 2017), some further theoretical work is crucial to develop a general 
and coherent social approach to the study of virtues that pays due attention to the role of 
social context and the importance of its constituent mircosociological processes. 
The argument made in this article draws from a wealth of sensitising concepts 
available in the social constructionist tradition, especially those found in the work of Rom 
Harré. While these microsociological theories – which develop from and rely upon the core 
thesis of the symbolic interactionists – have long been available, they have yet to be applied 
to questions of virtue or character development. The main contribution of this article, 
therefore, is to show how microsociology is highly relevant to this growing area of scientific 
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research. It does so in the following way. First, the popular misnomer that social construction 
necessarily comprises a radical anti-realism is challenged (Section 2). Second, the limitations 
of psychological approaches to character and virtue are evaluated in comparison to the 
insights possible with more contextualised social research (Section 3). These benefits are then 
grounded in a new sociological interpretation of Aristotle’s foundational text on virtue ethics 
(Section 4). Following this, Sections 5 and 6 consider in more detail how microsociological 
concepts, in particular positioning and group theory, may make a powerful contribution to 
understanding character development and virtue acquisition.     
  
2. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CHARACTER IN THE REALIST TRADITION 
Social research and action progress on the bases of ontological and epistemological 
assumptions (Crotty, 2000). While ontological positions are often not made explicit in many 
empirical studies, or in everyday decision-making, they are ultimately of importance. 
Whether UK businesses are more honest than in another country makes all the difference to 
an investor, while to measure a given population’s self-discipline also relies on a researcher’s 
assumption that that there may be ‘more’ of that character strength among one group of 
people than there is among another. In these examples virtues are said to exist in some sense, 
to vary between people, to be possessed by individual humans or human collectives, and to 
be manifest in their actions. While many psychologists tend to bypass the metaphysical 
assumptions of their methods, and philosophers on the whole rely on an ontological account 
of virtues being dispositions or even the skills of persons, social theorists have long-
entertained questions about the reality of comparable and related social entities such as roles, 
processes, norms, values and representations. 
Social construction is one broad tradition of social theory that emphasises the 
production of reality, including the self, through social interaction. It became prominent with 
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the publication of Berger and Luckman’s seminal work (1967), but soon developed into a 
movement with divergent epistemological and ontological positions (Harré & Van 
Langenhove, 1999). On one anti-realist extreme, constructionists influenced by postmodern 
philosophy began to consider their own studies as constructed knowledge only partially 
contingent upon an objective reality (Gergen, 1999). This view has attracted considerable 
critique (e.g. Hacking, 1999), but can be separated from the more classical traditions of realist 
social theory that attempt to unpack how an objective social reality may relate to subjective 
experience and be created through individual agency,or as Archer explains it, how in 
different contexts ‘pre-existing’ social structures may impinge on the efforts of individuals to 
then ‘elaborate’ them (Archer, 2000). Hence social constructionism in the realist tradition can 
be seen as an alternative to positivism and anti-realism (Harré, 2002), as often invoked by 
qualitative researchers, such as the ‘transcendental realism’ influentially advocated by Miles 
and Huberman (1994). 
The position presented here is not construction as an epistemological stance: that 
character is ‘only a social construction, revealing of the observer’s values but not of who or 
what is observed’ (Peterson & Seligman, 2006, p. 10). Rather, what is presented is a general 
social theoretical approach to explore how objective social processes are associated with 
specific given attributes. In short, while virtues are dispositions of individuals, they are also 
socially practiced. This means that they are amenable to sociological explanation. Social 
constructionism – conceived as a repertoire of foundational microsociological phenomena 
that share the basic assumption that meanings and behaviours are co-constructed through 
observable and established processes of social interaction – gives a suitable umbrella under 
which this investigation can happen.  
One of the goals of virtue ethicists and positive psychologists alike has been to 
understand how positive ‘traits’ may be instilled or ‘internalised’ in individuals, and how 
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particular dispositions may contribute to happiness or flourishing. These assumptions, which 
date from Aristotle’s notion of habituation, rely on theories of interaction that allow the 
transmission of ideal dispositions from exemplars to individuals (Bowditch, 2008; Narvaez & 
Lapsley, 2014). The processes of acquiring dispositions implicitly assumed in the scientific 
study of character can therefore be related to the perennial concern of social theorists to 
position themselves in regard to key dualisms which either prioritize the individual or the 
collective over the other in the production of behaviour and social reality (Layder, 2005). 
Finding our way through the binaries of micro/macro, agency/structure, and 
individual/society in regard to this, we may be inclined, on the face of it, to adopt an 
individualist view of virtue. A virtue is a trait attributable to a social actor on account of their 
effort, choice, habit, disposition or personality, and it therefore makes no sense to claim that 
virtues such as compassion or honesty exist in social structures and systems. In response to 
individualism, however, social theorists working in the social constructionist tradition, and its 
precursor, symbolic interactionism, give good reasons to reject individualist accounts because 
they do not suitably account for the dialogic relationship between the self and society (Mead, 
1934). For example, emotions can be shown to be socially moulded according to cultural or 
linguistic conventions (Aranguren, 2017; Harré, 1986). According to a similar account of 
human behaviour, good character, though requiring individual agency and skill, and a 
prerequisite biological basis, is also a cooperative achievement ultimately requiring others’ 
collaboration (Harré, 1993). 
Although perhaps counter-intuitive to some, theorising virtues as social practices 
allows for a realist position that goes beyond situationism to explain how virtue acquisition 
(and loss) can take place (Dagmang, 2012). Rather than merely qualities of the individual, 
various character attriubutes are manifest in structured social practices and representations 
that exist before individuals adopt them, which are then sustained, adapted or rejected by 
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them. While not an in-depth sociological account, a compatible position has been suggested 
by the communitarian virtue ethicist Alsadair MacIntyre (1984) who argues that virtues are 
inextricably linked with social practices of a given community. A similar interpretation, given 
below, can also be made of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, the founding text of virtue 
ethics (Aristotle, 2009). 
             
3. MICROSOCIOLOGY COMPLEMENTING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHARACTER 
Given the traditional definition that virtues are the dispositions of individuals to act 
virtuously, it is perhaps not surprising that psychologists have largely operationalised them 
using the psychometric approach of personality theory. For psychologists virtues are positive 
and stable character traits which have cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects 
(Berkowitz, 2011; Niemiec, 2013). Divisions between different kinds of virtues are often 
made, particularly between so-called performative character strengths, such as resilience, grit, 
perseverance and self-control, and moral or social/civic virtues that are concerned with moral 
choices, such as honesty and compassion. This dichotomy expresses a differencein focus 
between positive psychologists interested in enabling cognitive processes which can explain 
different kinds of success, such as ‘grit’ (Duckworth et al., 2007), and character educators 
who are more concerned with the moral aspect of character development, such as how that 
grit may be directed towards right action (Lickona & Davidson, 2007). 
While each approach has its merits and purposes, because of the nature of the 
discipline, psychological approaches to character in general are only secondarily concerned 
with the social contingencies of either kind of virtue. For example, it has been argued that 
moral expertise, conceived as a multi-faceted cognitive skill, is dependent on early life 
experience and other environmental factors, such as the availability of mentors (Narvaez & 
Lapsley, 2014). Similar assumptions about social context and behaviour are often implicit in 
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established measures of virtues. One of the most-used measures of character, the Values In 
Action Survey (VIA) measures respondents’ self-reported engagements in certain social 
practices related to character strengths (Peterson & Seligman, 2006). The construction of the 
measure began with a historical consideration of universal human characteristics present in 
religious and philosophical traditions worldwide. Within the resultant nomenclature of six 
universal virtues: wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, temperance and transcendence, further 
strengths of character and situational themes related to each of them were determined 
according to 10 criteria – including the stipulation that any character strength should be 
manifest in rituals and institutions across cultures. A similar observation can be made of 
measures of performance virtues in regard to their relationship with individuals’ agency and 
motivation. For example, the aforementioned measure of grit relies on the self-reports of 
respondents about their behaviour in relation to their goals and projects. While both these 
approaches access important aspects of character in these regards, they do so by 
decontextualizing and aggregating reported motivations and implicit references to the social 
environment of the participants in question. 
Measures of virtues that rely on self-reports have been critiqued on account of their 
reliance on subjective judgement (Kristjánsson, 2013). However, the ontological assumptions 
and theory of mind invoked by these measures have not been brought into full consideration, 
nor has the theoretical approach of social construction been brought to bear on the pursuit of 
alternative research designs in the field. Given its psycho-social remit of focusing on the 
relationship between the individual and external social processes, it is not surprising that 
those working in the constructionist tradition called for a revision of traditional psychological 
methods more generally (e.g. Gergen, 1999; Kvale, 1992; Smith et al, 1995). This movement 
subsequently led to the establishment of a variety of alternative research paradigms, such as 
discourse analysis, interpretative phenomenological analysis, critical realism and discursive 
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psychology, which have since illuminated research topics and practices across the social 
sciences. In order to show how a constructionist approach may complement traditional 
psychological methods similarly in the science of character, it is worth considering the 
critiques of constructionists which invigorated the search for hybrid paradigms in other areas. 
Rom Harré (1995) critiqued prevailing models of psychology on account that they 
posit the existence of unobservable mental processes. To Harré, this smacks of an implicit 
Cartesianism that in its contemporary form conceives the mind as a kind of stimulus-response 
computer within which certain mental substances react in predetermined ways (in the context 
of this article, these could be perseverance or integrity, for example). More appropriate, he 
argues is to study ‘active people … using material and symbolic tools to accomplish all sorts 
of projects according to local standards of correctness’ (p. 144). According to this alternative 
view, the problems inherent in using traditional psychological methods (like questionnaire 
based self-reports of virtues, for example) are fourfold: first, they do not account 
appropriatelyfor the specificity of individual agency and goals; secondly, they do not 
adequately account for, or profit from, a consideration of the social context behaviour takes 
place in; thirdly, they do not consider the discursive and symbolic processes by which people 
communicate, interpret or imbue meaning to their actions; and fourthly, in the place of 1-3, 
they posit dubious metaphysical mental entities, processual, cognitive or otherwise. 
The contribution of Harré’s observations to the study of character can be further 
understood by considering his critique of studies of moral reasoning (1983). The influential 
developmental paradigm of moral reasoning advanced by Laurence Kohlberg has left a 
substantial legacy in contemporary character research (Walker et al, 2017). However, 
according to Harré, this kind of approach misses important social determinants of moral 
behaviour by over-emphasising the role of moral cognitive skill at the expense of contextual 
understanding of expectations made of children, for example. This is not to say there is not 
 10 
 
neurological change developmentally, but that moral knowledge is also manifest in social 
displays that are culturally determined. The dilemmas posed by Kohlberg (and subsequently 
others) therefore do not present problems of reasoning that can determine stages of cognitive 
capacity, but challenging hypothetical scenarios whereby divergent moral assumptions are 
juxtaposed and respondents forced to choose one over the other. In the case of neo-
Kohlbergian measures, these involve presenting participants with identifiable role conflicts 
and asking them to take sides, for example between solidarity with one’s classmates, or with 
the teacher (Thoma et al, 2013). Such a choice, then measured against an expert panel 
assesses the extent to which a participant positions themselves in one moral order or another. 
More important, Harré argues in response to Kolhberg’s original theory, would be to 
understand how such moral orders function within specific groups. To assume virtue is a 
cognitive ability is to miss the point and make an ethnocentric claim based on the primacy of 
individualism to the North American mind. 
Although Harré’s position is a minority one, and his overall conjecture a closed 
debate for mainstream psychologists, it exposes important theoretical gaps in the 
psychological study of character that can be readily addressed using microsociological 
approaches. By prioritising the analysis of assumed cognitive processes of virtue, character 
strengths, rather than being explained in terms of social praxis and human agency, are 
considered to be the products of intermediary mental capacities. The resultant focus of 
establishing and measuring supposed cognitive aspects of virtue rather than making sense of 
the context in which virtues are enacted, causes problems for the study of character 
development in institutions in particular, including the evaluation of interventions intended to 
promote virtues. This is illustrated by the example of a case-study of character education 
programmes undertaken in three schools in Boston (Seider, 2012). In pre- and post- 
intervention tests of integrity and perseverance, students scored considerably lower on 
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average after a lengthy and multi-faceted character education programme intervention. This is 
because, Seider argues, students’ scores were affected by a high level of optimism of their 
own abilities at the beginning of the school year only to become more realistic after 
demanding courses of character education. While this is an astute explanation, it is a 
supposition that accompanied the use of measures, not one that was derived from their use. It 
therefore illustrates the difficulties of assuming virtues are, or are analogous to, the cognitive 
abilities of individuals, whereas in actual fact it seems that varying scores are better explained 
in recourse to a collective intention engendered by the motivation of students to succeed at 
school – an inference based on the assumption of a highly structured institutional context, and 
the agency of individuals in response to it. 
              
4. ARISTOTLE AS SOCIOLOGIST 
Before considering the contribution of a social constructionist account of character in more 
detail, it is appropriate to consider how aspects of microsociological theory may be 
compatible with Aristotle’s classic text on virtue ethics, The Nichomachean Ethics. As a 
foundational text of philosophy, it is to be expected that different interpretations have been 
made of Aristotle’s thought (Lewis, 2012). However, it is of note here, that in his discussion 
of virtue (or excellence), Aristotle does not focus on what have since become to be 
considered important characteristics of morality in the Christian and post-Christian eras, such 
as concern for other persons or moral duty, but instead writes about what constitutes good 
conduct for men of wealth who have the means to pursue happiness (Brown, 2009). As 
MacIntyre (1984) notes, The Nichomachean Ethics can be read as a sociological treatise with 
more in common with the approach of Erving Goffman than with the concerns of modern 
moral philosophers. While a more thorough commentary to Aristotle could be written along 
these lines, in respect to the limited present discussion, rather than give a synopsis, I make 
 12 
 
some observations of Aristotle’s approach and its underlying assumptions which have deep 
resonances with social constructionism. 
For Aristotle, virtues are performed. They are not mere capacities, but ‘states of 
character’ that ‘arise out of like activities’ (2009, p. 24). It is not by beauty or strength that 
athletes achieve award, Aristotle invites us to imagine, but through their action in 
competition. Moreover, while virtues should be best sought for their own sake, it is implicit 
in Aristotle’s explanation that they are performed within, and sometimes to sustain, status 
hierarchies. Actions are the means by which praise and honour are bestowed for particular 
character states – and the means by which attributions of vulgarity and dishonour are 
avoided. Aristotelean social actors learn socially appropriate emotions because of their 
actions, which are also logically related to their personal objectives. The performance of 
virtue is an end in itself, but virtues also help performers achieve their goals. As Aristotle 
argues, a doctor does not deliberate about whether to heal a patient, but on the best way to do 
so. Performing virtues thus fulfils the expectations of social roles, such as for the rightfully 
proud man, who acting according to his merits (and status), walks slowly and speaks with a 
low voice, indicating his lack of perturbation at anything life throws at him. In these respects, 
Aristotle’s view has synergies with contemporary notions of performativity and identity, that 
is, how actions bring about relatively (or apparently) stable phenomena, including the 
production of one’s own self (Butler, 2010). 
Given Aristotle’s teleological approach, a given man’s virtue will be those states of 
character that enable him to ‘do his own work well’ (p. 29). Agency is all important, as well 
as the unique circumstances of any action and their place in a narrative. Humans are not 
automata habituated into virtue through repetition of rigidly applicable rules of conduct. 
Virtue, calculated as the mean between two extremes of possible behaviour, is chosen 
through individuals’ own deliberation, for its own ends and is appropriate and proportionate 
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to a given situation. Virtue is ‘in our power’ (p. 46) but cannot have any fixity; it must be 
judged on a case-by-case basis by a virtuous actor according to their practical wisdom 
(phronesis).  For virtue to take place, therefore, Aristotle observes, it follows that a suitable 
social context must be available first. For someone to be just, they need the power to be so, 
and for someone to be courageous, they need the circumstances to show bravery. 
It is important to note that Aristotle did not consider it possible to make a 
mathematical-like scienceof virtue. But he did believe it was possible to give a general 
account of virtue according to the reasoning of social actors’ about their behaviour, and on 
the basis of how honour and dishonour are attributed in account of actions that produced 
virtue. Virtues are actions related to external systems of recognition, and the personal projects 
of social actors in relation to them: ‘For each state of character has its own ideas of the noble 
and the pleasant’ (p. 45). Given these assumptions, Aristotle’s inquiry considers the way 
people normally speak about character and virtues as a valid method by which to gain greater 
conceptual purchase as to what virtues are, and how they contribute to flourishing: ‘… we 
must consider happiness in the light not only of our conclusion and our premises, but also of 
what is commonly said about it; for with a true view all the data harmonize’ (p. 13). Thus, 
Aristotle’s approach is empirically-grounded in reasoning about people’s general perceptions 
of virtue, and analyses of people’s actions in context. In other words, it is an interpretative 
sociological account.  
  
5. THE STRUCTURE OF VIRTUOUS SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONS 
This section gives a preliminary account of how established elements of microsociological 
theory relate to the science of character. While much of the tentative account given here 
engages with Rom Harré’s interpretation of concepts from classical symbolic interactionism, 
in particular Goffman (1956) and Mead (1934), the ideas of other scholars in this broad 
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tradition and its legacies would be in no doubt applicable for further refined theoretical 
advances and future empirical studies. Like the approach of Aristotle, sociological 
suppositions are empirically-grounded, drawing on theory and logical reasoning to direct 
observation and vice-versa. The examples given in this article arise from focused 
ethnographies of character education programmes in two secondary schools in Mexico made 
in early 2017. As a fledgling conceptual framework, each of the components sketched out 
merit further work, and are relevant to exploring virtues among various other social groups 
and institutions in situ. 
One elemental building-block of social ontology is that of coordinated behaviour in 
the form of interactional social episodes (Harré, 1993). Our task here is to understand how 
and why social episodes produce performances recognised as virtues; how a sequence of 
social episodes eventually lead to more stable judgements about individuals recognised as 
those having good character; and further, how these activities can result in the representation 
and reproduction of virtues. In regard to the first two objectives, neither of these kinds of 
recognition is merely subjective. Virtues must be attributed according to rules of application 
located in a moral order. It is because of the rooting of these processes in predictable social 
structures emerging from their constituent interactions that we can posit a social theory of 
character and elaborate it in diverse contexts. 
Social role has been identified as an important but overlooked aspect of character, but 
this has yet to be fully explored (Chen, 2013). One obvious relationship between social role 
and virtue already discussed is that the expectations that go with certain social roles 
necessitate the exercise of certain virtues. Aristotle noted this of courage for soldiers in the 
face of battle, for example. However, social role in itself is not enough to explain virtue 
performance – soldiers may not always be brave and students may not always be responsible, 
etc. Nevertheless, virtues cannot be performed outside of any social role. For any account of 
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character in sociological context, the relationship between social role and virtues must be 
fully considered. Positioning theory (Harré& Van Langenhove, 1998) is one such 
development from classic role theory that gives a dynamic account of social role allowing for 
a more nuanced understanding of the multi-directional relationships between playing one’s 
role, attaining virtue and achieving one’s projects. According to this view, in any interaction, 
people position themselves, or are positioned by others within a moral order – a system of 
moral rights, responsibilities and obligations assigned to them. When a teacher asks students 
to read in class, she positions herself as a teacher with the right and responsibility to do so, 
and the student with the obligation to follow her command. The student, if accepting of the 
positioning of ‘student’, reads. A further useful distinction is that of first order positioning 
and second order positioning, the latter being a repositioning of the attribution of the first. For 
example, the student may not accept the positioning of the teacher and refuse to read because 
she read yesterday and it is someone else’s turn, thus self-assigning a new position in the 
unfolding episode. Although this is an example with very distinct roles (as found in schools 
and other institutional contexts), positioning theory gives the conceptual apparatus to explore 
more complex and subtle interactions within a moral framework of rights, responsibilities and 
obligations which illuminate the performance of virtues. It provides a hermeneutic for 
empirical investigation into how the virtues may be practically applied (potentially allowing 
for further understanding into the complexities of phronesis – how an individual may respond 
to a given situation wisely). 
Deciding how to position oneself in any episode requires agency, judgment and action 
in real-time – all of which depend on one’s goals and one’s position. While we cannot 
assume that always acting out the assigned responsibilities of a first order position may entail 
the correct performance of virtues, one’s position in an unfolding sequence will always 
determine whether or not one has the opportunity to enact a given virtue. For example, it is 
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very difficult for modesty to be achieved by someone in a subordinate position. It can only be 
the responsibility of someone who is owed credit due to their positioning. A failing child 
cannot be modest on account of their poor exam performance. It follows that to acquire good 
character in respect to a given virtue, one needs to be positioned to allow for the execution of 
a virtue related to the practice of the rights and responsibilities that goes with that position. 
The performance of virtue is a positioned agreement or positioned contention based on 
assigned positions in a given sequence of social episodes which are co-constructed socially – 
what Harré terms a ‘storyline’ (1997). Positioning oneself well across multiple episodes 
constitutes good character. An otherwise generous act may smack of condescension, one-
upmanship, or even contempt when attempted from the wrong position or at the wrong point 
in a sequence of episodes. The same is true for compassion, modesty, honesty. Aristotle’s 
account also implies a narrative or historical approach is appropriate in this sense. (If we need 
to know why certain actions were chosen in order to evaluate their virtue, we need to know 
social actors’ reasoning for their actions in context.) The creative ability to take a position 
and to innovate and thus re-form any given situation is the peculiar power of the human agent 
(as well as a central tenet of social constructionism, so conceived). Far from being subjective 
or relative, the meanings of interactions (verbal or otherwise) are usually unambiguous in this 
sense. If interactions were not mutually understood according to external templates of 
conduct, and if people were unable to elaborate on these and change unfolding storylines 
through contestation or agreement, good character would be impossible to achieve. 
A more sophisticated understanding of role performance also allows for a more 
complex exploration of one of the most widely acclaimed social processes extolled by the 
character education movement: the transmission of virtue through moral exemplars, or role 
modelling. Philosophers and psychologists often rely on moral exemplars to explain virtue 
acquisition, while character education is often thought to take place through students’ 
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emulation of their teachers’ virtues (Arthur et al, 2016; Kristjánsson, 2017). However, 
empirical evidence of teachers’ role modelling in schools is limited (Willems et al., 
2012).Differences of age, gender, or other factors such as religion or ethnicity affect 
processes of identification between students and teachers (Moulin-Stożek & Schirr, 2017). 
Indeed, it seems few students want to be like their teachers, apart from those that would like 
to become teachers themselves in the future. These problems expose wider complexities with 
the theory of moral exemplarity that occur when there are differences between the social role 
and status of exemplars and their supposed emulators (Chen, 2013). Students occupy quite 
distinct positions in any given classroom episode to their teachers. Emulation may take place, 
but rather than through emulation of virtues by identification, it is through differentiation of 
positioning that the teacher makes requests from her students by the allocation of different 
rights and responsibilities to them than her own. They can choose to accept these, or, as Harré 
suggests they can face the penalties. The established moral order of a given context and its 
associated processes of representation will therefore likely give a more satisfactory account 
of virtue transmission than role modelling alone. 
The concept of a moral order gives the means to explore how an individual’s 
positioning may relate to a local social context in any given episode. A moral order is a co-
constructed system of rights, responsibilities and obligations communicated through ritual 
and other symbolic means in a social group (Harré, 1983). Thus while an individual acts for 
him or herself, his or her actions often support existing moral orders wittingly or not. Social 
episodes take place following templates that sustain roles positioned within systems of 
assigned rights and responsibilities often according to status (Harré, 1993). General principles 
of conduct for interaction are often established by those higher in a given hierarchy (e.g. 
those who have more power to demand certain rights and exercise certain responsibilities). 
The concept of a moral order therefore gives a framework to understand which virtues are 
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prioritised and why in a given group or institution, such as a school as an official institution, 
or one of the many informal adolescent peer-groups within that school. 
One key observation of those working in the symbolic interactionist and social 
constructionist traditions is that a given moral order is often more amoral than we would like 
to think, or at least more amoral than supposed by moral philosophers (Goffman, 1956; 
Harré, 1983). Rather than questions of justice, moral action is usually directed at giving 
respect and honour where it is due, and saving face when it is necessary. Honour codes thus 
function to preserve status hierarchies – of which there may be many even within the same 
social groups or institutions. People may vie to establish their respective positioning in a 
status hierarchy. We could add that this may even be dependent on the display and 
attributions of certain virtues. In the context of a school, for example, student sub-cultures 
create resistance strategies in contradiction with official expectations through the exhibition 
of alternative virtues (or anti-virtues). This can cause role conflicts that present dilemmas in 
the performance of virtues which are often about to whom virtuous behaviour is deserved: the 
moral order of the teacher, or that of one’s friends. (As discussed previously in relation to 
Thoma et al.’s (2013) measure of moral reasoning). Duplicity is one often overlooked 
problem in the science of character to which positioning theory gives some satisfactory 
explanation. 
Ritual sustains moral orders by reinforcing habitual behaviours and conditioning 
appropriate emotional responses through collective activities and day-to-day routines of 
interactions. Rituals also represent idealised representations of virtues through symbolic 
action and often assign honour on account of attributed virtues. Sport is one form of 
collective ritual which allows for honour to be paid for the display and cultivation of 
performative virtues such as determination, but also others such as fairness, responsibility and 
teamwork. In schools, as well as through sport, assemblies may have the ritual function of 
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celebrating, directly or indirectly, the performance of desired virtues. However, subcultures 
may develop their own symbolic defiance in response toofficial representations of virtues 
given in collective ritualsand by other means by which celebrity status (notoriety) can be 
achieved within alternative hierarchies. Greetings are one form of daily ritual interaction 
whereby virtues of friendliness and solidarity are performed. These can also be used to 
cement individuals’ social statuses and group identifications, including sub-cultures, such as 
highly specific and technical handshake configurations used in the performative construction 
of gang boundaries. 
So far, we have considered the dynamics of momentary interactions – repetitive, ritual 
disputed, agreed, or otherwise, and how they may bear on the performance of virtue. But a 
person’s character develops over time and across multiple social contexts and moral orders. It 
is constructed through thousands of daily interactions. A useful way to conceptualise the 
ability of individuals to direct their own character development by the exercising of their own 
agency across multiple contexts is Harré’s (1983) idea of an identity project – the use of 
social and linguistic conventions present in a moral order to become unique. Identity projects 
can be social or personal: the former pertaining to group practices and bonds (and their 
related symbolic displays), the latter to the development of a persona in a well-established 
role. Both types of project involve the cultivation of agreed attributions that sustain identity – 
including the performance and recognition of all kinds of virtues (and vices). Goffman’s 
notion of a moral career explains how interactions may bear on an individual’s character in 
the context of an institution in particular (Goffman, 1961; Harré, 1993). Aside from public 
recognition through various forms of ritual, position is attributed privately through the means 
of gossip, which remains an under-researched but key aspect of the social construction of 
character as reputation (Harré, 1993). This is marked in institutions such as schools, which in 
some ways function like Goffman’s asylum, but often with the development of character as 
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one of their primary goals. Nevertheless, the family and other groups also act as institutions 
whereby character is socially constructed through the performance, assignment, adaptation, 
recognition and representation of virtues.  
Virtues may be represented and engendered in institutions through materiality as well 
as performance. This can include practical means, such as the provision of spaces so they are 
amenable to certain kinds of interaction, and symbolic communication, like the use of slogans 
and personifications to communicate desired actions and patterns of thinking. In these ways 
representations of desired virtues in a given moral order are sustained and institutionalised. 
Religion, such as Catholicism, gives the most obvious example of how virtues can be 
institutionalised symbolically and transmitted through materiality, participative ritual and the 
attribution of moral status in a community. This perhaps explains findings of several studies 
that show positive associations between the virtues of given moral orders and religious 
practice or salience (e.g. Moulin-Stożek et al., 2018). 
In regard to the two schools in which observations were made, it is worth noting that, 
following Durkhiem, representations of desired virtues were symbolically manifest in 
collective rituals central to both communities: the Catholic mass in a private school and the 
civic flag parade in a public school. In both cases, not only are representations of virtues 
articulated verbally and through the exhibition of moral exemplars; they are also embodied 
and ritually performed by personifications of virtues, including the parade of exemplary 
students. Indeed, in schools, virtue words – ‘honesty’, ‘punctuality’, ‘responsibility’ etc. – are 
often used to invoke abstract ideals or imperatives of behaviour quite distinct from the trait of 
any particular individual. One good definition of them would be that they are social 
representations or imaginaries rather than anyone’s specific ‘traits’. 
Social representations of virtues will play a key part in the way a given moral order 
will impact on an individual’s self-image directly. But more important will be the part a 
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person actually plays in the moral order and their elaboration of its constituent structures 
(their repeated positioning over time and their negotiation of role-conflicts etc.), and the 
consequences of these actions in the esteem reflected back at them. An identity project is not 
a subjective process, but a dialogic one. Flourishing may be the result of the correct 
performance of virtues, but in every case, a person needs to exercise their agency and be in 
the social position to do so. This simple point opens up the science of character to a whole 
area of the social sciences concerned with cultural representations – substantively, 
methodologically and conceptually. For example, the work of Charles Taylor (1994) and 
Stuart Hall (1996) build upon symbolic interactionism to develop sophisticated hermeneutics 
to explore how systems of representation may impact on the character of minority groups in 
specific ways. These issues are important for the study of character across cultures, and in 
plural contexts, particularly to understand how gender, social class, religion and cultural 
background may impact on character, virtue and flourishing in specific social settings 
(Moulin, 2015). If the social construction of character is in any sense true, it warns us that 
any individual will need repeated social permissions to flourish. This important point gives a 
theoretical weight to concerns already aired about the growing global character movement 
(Camfield, 2015; Alexander, 2016; Kirchglasler, 2018).     
  
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF VIRTUE RESEARCH 
Given the aim of many in the character movement to not only research, but promote 
wellbeing, it is perhaps not surprising that there has been a focus on measuring the capacities 
of individuals in order to apply what are presumed to be the methods of natural sciences to 
give the science of character credibility. However, it is worth considering the constructionist 
approach because it exposes substantial gaps in the science of character, most notably the 
social processes by, and the social contexts in which, good character is chosen, attributed and 
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achieved. Positive psychology can be critiqued on the grounds of working on a too narrow 
conception of legitimate science which if broadened to include alternative modes of analysis, 
such as observation of social life, or a detailed study of the intentions and beliefs of social 
actors in regard to virtue development in distinct contexts and institutions, would be 
strengthened. Research designs that aggregate data relevant to multiple social episodes and 
show that they are related on balance to certain beliefs of social actors about themselves is 
one way to study character. However, there is more to be explained. Good character cannot 
be reduced to supposed individual capacity because correct behaviour must also comply with 
the correct way of doing something as determined by external rules (Harré, 1986). In addition 
to psychological approaches therefore more work is needed to establish how virtues are 
adopted, attributed and cultivated through symbolic means, and how individual agency is 
involved in the context of such interactional processes. The study of individuals’ variances in 
terms of their supposed psychological traits and dispositions may not be as profitable as 
studying their motivations in social context and how virtues are attributed, chosen, exhibited 
and communicated between individuals. That virtues are co-constructed, innovated and 
improvised among individuals does not mean they are relative or subjective: they are the 
result of stable, observable and predictable social structures and practices. 
As Aranguren (2017) observes of emotion, the suggestion that good character and 
virtue are socially constructed will not be surprising to sociologists and anthropologists, but 
maybe perplexing for most psychologists and biologists. However, exploring questions about 
character by applying insights from the social constructionist tradition opens up the 
possibility of making a strong argument for a realist account of virtues and explaining how 
they are collectively achieved in different contexts without collapsing into individualism, 
situationism or relativism. Virtues are socially realised, attributed and enacted. They are 
produced dialogically between pre-existing performed traditions of social praxis on the one 
 23 
 
hand, and through the intentions, aspirations and projects of individuals on the other. While 
further work is necessary to explore the social practice of specific virtues in context, as a 
general approach, social constructionism gives scope for exploring how institutions and their 
associated social practices impact on human flourishing. It considers how social context 
influences individuals, and how individuals may influence their social context. This is 
important because enhancing character through institutional change is the principal and end 
goal of many character researchers’ efforts (Miller & Prentice, 2016). 
The job of the researcher of character is to consider how social processes function in 
any given context, and for any given virtue, among a group or for an individual. While this 
may involve interpretation, this does not imply that such interpretations are not logically 
related to a researcher’s observations of an objective and predictable social reality. An 
account of character and virtue founded on a study of social processes and practices, and the 
agency of social actors in relation to them, is therefore, in the realist tradition, empirically 
testable. While the argument given in this present article draws on literature in the 
interpretative tradition, there is scope to operationalise and evaluate the social processes 
suggested using quantitative methods of data generation. Aristotle observed in The 
Nichomachean Ethics, ‘it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class 
of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept 
probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician demonstrative 
proofs’ (2009, p. 4). In regard to the second clause, the same could be said of a positive 
psychologist and an interpretative sociologist, but perhaps both would benefit from more 
opportunity to converse with one another. 
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